[ The following is a paper presented by Suman Pradhan at a symposium entitled “Nepal Briefing: A Social, Political, and Economic Update” held at the Northern California Center of the Asia Society in San Francisco on June 14, 2006. The program was part of the Asia Society’s ongoing Country Briefing Series and was organized in association with the Nepal Association of Northern California ]

I have been asked by the program organizers to give a brief historical overview of Nepal’s political turmoil. I thank the organizers for this opportunity, but I also want to stress that I am not an expert, merely an observer of events. And even so, I have not been able to observe recent events back home, ensconced as I have been at Stanford. So even before I begin, I apologize for any shortcomings in my presentation.

I’d like to begin with an anecdote. I recall a moment 11 years ago when I was a young reporter at The Kathmandu Post newspaper. I had written a news report on a mass rally organized by Nepal Sadbhavana Party (NSP). The NSP, as many of you know, represents the Madhesis of Nepal who have historically felt excluded from the mainstream. They inhabit the south and share the language and culture of our southern neighbour. My report dwelt with some of the grievances felt by the NSP, namely their demand for more representation in government and bureaucracy. The news was not published. My senior editors felt “it was too inflammatory, and that it risked upsetting the communal harmony of the country.” And this was at a time when Nepalis of all stripes were crying hoarse over the ill-treatment of Nepali-Bhutanese in Bhutan. We just failed to see how the two issues, different on the surface, were actually one and the same.

Fast forward now to the present. Almost all news organizations in Nepal today compete with one another to report the latest grievances, view-points, demands of the various political parties, ethnic, religious and linguistic groups. No stories of this nature are killed by editors these days. Indeed, Nepal is witnessing a spirited debate on all these fronts. How the times have changed. And for this, you have to credit the Maoists. While there are many questions over the Maoists’ true intentions and their ultimate goal, while they have shown themselves to be brutal in numerous instances during the conflict, one cannot deny that they have given voice to the hitherto unspoken grievances felt by Nepal’s excluded communities. More than their weapons, it is this that has helped the Maoists become a potent political force today. It is sad that Nepal’s excluded communities had to ally with a violent group to bring their grievances to the fore. That need not have happened, if only our political parties and our leaders had addressed these issues from 1990.

The 1990 change was truly historic in nature. Thirty years of autocratic Panchayat rule was overthrown by the first People’s Movement. A tripartite agreement led to a new constitution. Many historically aggrieved groups wanted their say in the new constitution, but they were all ignored for the sake of a singular identity by the drafters of the constitution. The constitution was focussed on dealing with the hard-core political issues and not the so-called soft issues espoused by the excluded communities. This problem was later compounded by the extreme competitiveness and narrow-mindedness of Nepal’s political parties. After the initial 3 years of stability from 1991-94, the country was engulfed in a cycle of short-lived governments, parliamentary theatrics and even accusations of kidnapping and bribery by sitting ministers. And of course, not to forget wide-spread corruption and nepotism. It was in this climate that the Maoists emerged on the scene.

Initially, the Maoists emerged as a classical communist insurgency. Their ideology and tactics were in large part copied from Chairman Mao’s experiences in China. But over time, what we saw was the gradual co-opting of the “exclusion” felt by Nepal’s various groups. By 2000, the Maoists had successfully refashioned themselves as liberators of the oppressed communities. From 2001 onwards, they went one step ahead and began declaring “Autonomous People’s Republics” in various parts of Nepal – 11 in all. Women, historically oppressed, were included in large numbers in their ranks, and gender equality has been a defining characteristic of the movement.

As this was occurring, national politics was still dominated by the parties and the monarch who were engulfed in their own game of one-upmanship. This became particularly true after June 2001 when the old King Birendra and his family was murdered. A new King, Gyanendra, never one to trust the democratic process, ascended to the throne. Misgivings about his democratic credentials quickly came to fruition when, within a year of coming to power, a split was engineered in the Nepali Congress party over the issue of emergency rule. Shortly thereafter, the splinter Congress, led by Sher Bahadur Deuba who headed the government with support from the King, allowed the local elected bodies to lapse without a replacement in place. Of all the decisions of the short-sighted Deuba government, this would be one that would come back to haunt the country later. By lapsing elected local bodies, and again by asking the king to dissolve parliament in May 2002 to settle an intra-party dispute, the Deuba government set the stage for both the king and Maoists to carve up the country between themselves. For the first time since 1990, Nepal lacked any representative form of government. Without a parliament and elected local bodies, all politics in the countryside gravitated towards those who held the guns. The period from 2001 has seen the greatest expansion of Maoist influence throughout Nepal. With no parliament to challenge him, the King summarily dismissed the Deuba government in October 2002, his first coup.

The King could have been stopped then. But the political parties had generated so much ill will by then that the population was unwilling to intervene on their behalf. This apathy was read by international donors and governments as loss of support for the political parties. The donors too failed to condemn the king’s brazen seizure of power, only whetting his appetite for more power. A succession of hand-picked governments followed. In February 2005, the king did away with any pretensions of democracy by formally seizing all power. We need not go into details as to what happened next. Suffice to say that the coup was quickly followed by a severe crackdown on political parties, the media, human rights activists and civil society. Many were thrown in jail. Countless others were held incommunicado for long periods of time. Human rights violations by the security forces intensified, turning Nepal into the country with most “disappearances.”

From what we know of that period, the King seems to have grossly miscalculated. Seeing no public support for the political parties, he mistook that as support for the monarchy. The international community, which was reluctant to condemn his first coup in 2002, was suddenly jolted out of their deep slumber. India, the US, UK and EU took the lead in condemning the coup and withholding all military assistance. But the King did not give in. Indeed, he upped the ante by bringing in reviled faces from the Panchayat past into his government. People like Tulsi Giri, Kirtinidhi Bista, Sharad Chandra Shah, which Nepalis had thought they had dealt with in 1990, were suddenly ruling the country on the King’s behalf. It did not take long for the people to see through the King’s ruse. Here was a monarch, who already had not just a crisis of credibility but also a crisis of legitimacy, resurrecting the Panchayat in another name. The King also actively tried to play the China card to sway Indian policy, but that attempt too fell flat.

In the end, the king seems to have sealed his own fate by deliberately alienating the democratic parties who were the only bulwark between him and the republican Maoists. By alienating them and holding them in contempt, he pushed the parties into a formal alliance with the Maoists. The three-way struggle had again turned into a two-way conflict but not necessarily the way as many had hoped: instead of the king and parties on one side, the monarch’s actions paved the way for the parties and Maoists to join hands against himself. There is evidence that India played a facilitating role in bringing about this alliance. The 12-point agenda which the parties forged with the Maoists served as the basis of the renewed people’s movement in April. In 19 days, as the fury on the streets threatened to engulf the Palace, the King capitulated. Many observers credit the Maoists for making the movement a success. While there is evidence that they meticulously planned for the movement and hoped for a general insurrection, thus enabling them to seize power at the right moment, the events on the streets far outpaced their own planning. The parties too appear to have been caught off guard by the fury, and for many days, no politician of any stature was seen leading the movement. It was people power all the way.

Nepal now has a resurrected parliament, a party-led government, and a fledgling cease-fire and peace process underway. However, it is fair to say that the real hard work has only just begun.

The new parliament has lost no time in making some historic decisions – for example, declaring Nepal a secular state, providing equal rights to women, banning untouchability, declaring parliamentary control over the army, abolishing the king’s role in parliament, etc. While well-intentioned and to a large extent reflecting the spirit of the peoples’ movement, questions over the legality of the decisions remain. Does parliament have a right to make those declarations when the constitution it is functioning under explicitly bars changes to the state structure? Moreover, some of the declarations – particularly the one concerning secular state – risks giving rise to potent spoilers to the peace process. We have already witnessed venting of religious ire in Birgunj. There is no guarantee that the monarchical feudalists who for long drew legitimacy from religious constituencies will not try to use this issue for their own benefit.

These declarations have also brought out the latent divisions between the Seven Party Alliance (SPA) and Maoists. The Maoists have repeatedly urged the SPA to dissolve the parliament and host a round-table discussion immediately. They want the round-table to lead to an interim government, and then holding of constituent assembly elections. But the SPA government is dragging its foot on that key issue, agreeing only to send parliament into recess for a few weeks.

If you look at the 12-point agreement, these divisions are not new. Both sides have held to their respective positions, as contained in the document. It is to the SPA’s credit that parliament is in existence. They are not about to let it go without an alternative in place. The latest statement from Maoist leader Krishna Bahadur Mahara is perhaps an attempt to tone down these differences. But we are still uncertain how this process will unfold in the near future.

Another issue now of course is how do you conduct elections to the constituent assembly? Before such an election is held, there is the need to demobilize the armed groups and ensure a monitoring mechanism is in place. This can only be provided by a reputed international group, preferably the UN. But the government has yet to officially invite the UN. We still don’t know what role the UN will play even if invited. And what will be India’s policy towards any UN involvement? There is some evidence that India may agree to a UN role, but not necessarily to a UN peace-keeping role in Nepal. If that is the case, then what leverage will the UN have in ensuring that the armed groups not influence the elections?

In the short term, we are likely to see an agreement for a roundtable and a new interim government, followed by the arrival of international monitors. It will be a while before any fixed dates for constituent assembly elections are announced. At this point, it is also difficult to say whether the new constitution that emerges from the constituent assembly will be monarchical or republican. While the Maoists are avowedly republican, the senior leaders of the Nepali Congress party have been espousing the idea of a ceremonial monarchy. This is against the wishes of their own youth supporters who are strongly in favour of a republican set up. The UML, however, has officially adopted republican goals.

More important than the fate of the monarchy, however, is what shape the new state structure will take, and whether that can resolve the historical exclusion felt by communities and regions. None of the more positive changes in society can be effected without the democratic political parties and strong civil society. It is easy to blame the parties for all their past mistakes, but we have to realize that for the vast majority of Nepalis who believe neither in divine right to rule nor in the gun, the parties remain the only hope. But to gain the people’s trust again, the parties must reform. They may espouse democracy, but they are far from democratic in their own structures. Inclusion is a solution not only for the state but also for the political parties.

Though the road ahead is difficult, there is a feeling of hope, of optimism, that for once, Nepal is now on the right path.

Suman Pradhan
Journalist
John S Knight Fellow at Stanford University – 2006
14 June 2006